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Abstract: Information accounting provides a better foundation for hypothesis testing than does uncertainty 
quantification. A quantitative account of science is derived under this perspective that alleviates the need for 
epistemic bridge principles, solves the problem of ad hoc falsification criteria, and deals with verisimilitude by 
facilitating a general approach to process-level diagnostics. Our argument is that the well-known inconsistencies 
of both Bayesian and classical statistical hypothesis tests are due to the fact that probability theory is an 
insufficient logic of science. Information theory, as an extension of probability theory, is required to provide a 
complete logic on which to base quantitative theories of empirical learning. The organizing question in this case 
becomes not whether our theories or models are more or less true, or about how much uncertainty is associated 
with a particular model, but instead whether there is any information available from experimental data that might 
allow us to improve the model. This becomes a formal hypothesis test, provides a theory of model diagnostics, 
and suggests a new approach to building dynamical systems models. 
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1. Motivation and Overview 
The ostensible objective of this paper is to outline a conceptual framework for testing and evaluating models in a 
way that facilitates reliable scientific learning. An important example of this is in the Earth and Environmental 
Sciences, where improved process understanding is critical to making informed decisions under nonstationary 
climatological and anthropogenic conditions. Put simply, complex systems models must be able to produce 
accurate and reliable predictions due to the fact that they are in some sense isomorphic with the systems that they 
represent, rather than because they are developed or calibrated to agree with observations.  
An optimistic perspective might be that our understanding of how to evaluate complex systems models is in a pre-
normal phase. There are effectively innumerable reports, published across all fields of science, that propose and/or 
apply varied and non-commensurate methods for model evaluation, benchmarking, intercomparison, etc. Oreskes 
& Belitz (2001) recognize a fundamentally subjective component to model evaluation. Related to the 
Environmental Sciences in particular, Beck et al. (2009) outlined in their NSF white paper a ‘Grand Challenge’ 
related to the need for “radically novel procedures and algorithms … to rectify the chronic, historical deficit of 
the past four decades in engaging complex models systematically and successfully with field data for the purposes 
of learning and discovery.”  
A more pessimistic view comes from recognizing that the problem of reconciling complex systems models with 
observations is fundamentally hard. The confirmation holism problem (Severo, 2012), which is an aspect of the 
Duhem-Quine thesis (Harding, 1976), proposes that scientists are only able to test models in toto, and that it is 
impossible to test individual scientific hypotheses. Lenhard & Winsberg (2011) argued that a consequence of this 
is that we “are likely to continue to be unable to attribute the various sources of [climate model] successes and 
failures to their internal modeling assumptions.” Leaving aside whether the situation is quite so hopeless, it is 
certainly true that we currently lack any fundamental theory of how to diagnose individual components of 
reductionist-type models of systems that are composed of many interacting components and processes.  
	 2	
We are optimists. The remainder of this essay will argue that meaningful and general solutions to the related 
problems of model evaluation and model diagnostics require rather fundamental adjustment to both the 
philosophy and practice of model-based science. Our argument is that many of the practical challenges that 
modelers face on a day-to-day basis are due to certain deeply rooted logical inconsistencies (e.g., Nearing et al., 
2016b) in our standard suite of quantitative methods of inference. These inconsistencies turn out to be largely 
related to the fact that all of our statistical methods are built fundamentally around a concept of uncertainty 
(imprecise doxastic states) and that uncertainty is strictly non-quantifiable (i.e., all probability distributions are 
wrong).  
We propose that it is possible to develop a coherent method of science that does not require explicit treatment of 
uncertainty. Instead of using methods of inference that treat uncertainty (e.g., probabilistic or statistical hypothesis 
tests), we base our methods of inference on measures of information. In particular, we measure whether 
observation data contains information that may be used to improve a model. We do this by first noting that 
probability theory lacks the ability to describe a certain fundamental component of epistemic behavior during 
empirical inquiry, and therefore cannot be a complete logic of science. This deficiency is remedied with 
information theory.  
The basic insight, which we adopt from Jaynes (2003; p21), is that any logic of hypothesis testing acts on 
statements about what we know about states of affairs in the world (epistemic propositions), rather than on 
statements about states of affairs in the world (ontic propositions). Notice that this is exactly what occurs under 
all types of probabilistic inference – probabilities are epistemic statements, and these are the quantities that are 
manipulated during a hypothesis test or application of Bayes’ theorem.  
Accordingly, if predictions derived from scientific hypotheses are statements about states of affairs (i.e., the 
model makes a prediction about what will happen), then any system of logic capable of supporting a scientific 
method must necessarily include a theory for relating such ontic propositions with epistemic propositions (i.e., 
what we learn from predictive models). This effectively means assigning probabilities to model predictions and 
also to observation data. We will refer to methods for assigning quantitative translations between ontic and 
epistemic propositions as epistemic bridges1. Epistemic bridges are things like error functions, performance 
metrics, and/or likelihood functions. The challenge – as we will discuss in Section 2 and associated Appendices – 
is that ad hoc assignment of epistemic bridges can cause substantial errors during inference (e.g., Beven et al., 
2008).  
This problem is resolved by noting that there exists a fully developed logical theory that relates ontic with 
epistemic propositions. This theory is not a bridge principle – it is a necessary and unique consequence of the 
calculitic system of logic that supports and includes probability theory. This is described in accessible detail by 
(Knuth, 2004), and taking this fact seriously allows us to avoid the need for any ad hoc metrics or any choice of 
adequacy or falsification criteria. Section 3 discusses how improving the underlying logic of hypothesis testing 
allows us to resolve at least many of the hard practical problems related to hypothesis testing and model 
evaluation.  
We offer no opinion on scientific realism, however we do point out that any quantitative method for assigning 
degrees of belief about truth-values of models will necessarily contain contradiction simply because all models 
are approximations. And so we see it as inevitable that any formal and quantitative account of inference will not 
treat models as truth-apt (Bayesianism, for example, does assign doxastic measures to models, but fails to do so 
reliably). Because we have given up any pretense of searching for truth-values of models, it is therefore necessary 
to somehow draw a distinction between models that are empirically justifiable, and those that are somehow 
isomorphic with real-world systems. Section 4 applies the theory from Section 3 to this purpose. 
In the first sentence of this essay we said that our ostensible objective is to outline a conceptual framework for 
evaluating models. However, there is no way to test any hypothesis except by first embedding it into one or more 
																																																						
1The term bridge principle refers to any explicit connection between different bodies of theory. Here we use the term epistemic bridge to refer to a 
proposition that relates any ontological theory with any epistemological theory.  
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predictive models (Cartwright, 1983). This means that any theory of model evaluation is actually a theory of 
science writ large, and any theory of science is a theory of model evaluation – there is no distinction between 
these two things. Thus, the real objective of this essay is to propose a theory of science. Specifically, while it is 
true that there are no criteria (e.g., falsifiability) sufficient to differentiate a hypothesis as either scientific or non-
scientific (Laudan, 1983), we can demarcate combinations of models plus experiment as either scientific or non-
scientific depending on whether the experiment is sufficient to indicate (either formally or informally) the 
information content of the hypothesis about the experimental data. Information content of a model is defined here 
as the fractional ability of model predictions to inform variability in experimental data. 
2. Uncertainty 
2.1. Epistemological Foundations: Logic and Probability Theory 
Before we can undertake any meaningful investigation, scientific or otherwise, it is necessary to have a clearly 
defined logical environment. As Quine (1986; chapter 6) put it, changing our logic is akin to changing the 
question. Without a well-specified system of logic, we cannot ask a well-formed question and there is no hope of 
consistency. As alluded to above, our argument is that many of the scientific community’s practical challenges 
related to model evaluation are actually due to primitive logical inconsistencies (Nearing et al., 2016b). Any 
scientific method or practice that we derive will depend completely on our logical primitives.  
We will use here what is unarguably the most common system of logic, based on the axioms that Russell (1912; 
chapter VII) – perhaps controversially (e.g., Bueno and Colyvan, 2004) – called self-evident. In this context, all 
propositions are either true or false (excluded middle) but not both (non-contradiction), and although we often do 
not know the truth-values of a given set of propositions, we may have some ability to formulate consistent 
doxastic states. 
This system of logic, which we will hereafter refer to as the classical logic, leads to a standard propositional 
algebra2, however this logic remains insufficient to describe any dynamic learning process because it does not 
contain a variable that is subject to change. To describe a dynamic learning process we need a calculus, and Cox 
(1946) laid the groundwork for a demonstration (Terenin and Draper, 2015) that the only scalar calculus that is 
consistent with the classical logic is probability theory, at least under certain relatively weak assumptions (Van 
Horn, 2003). For an accessible treatment of this see Jaynes (2003; chapter 1). While there certainly exist other 
epistemic calculi that do not derive from the classical logic (e.g., Kosko, 1990, Chang, 1958, Rescher, 1968), it is 
necessary that we have some logical calculus if we want to formalize any method of science, and for the rest of 
this essay we will work under the classical logic and its unique scalar extension into the probability calculus. 
Like all formal systems of logic, the probability calculus describes relationships between propositions. Note two 
things: 1) that probability distributions are always conditional on a priori information (Jaynes, 2003; p43) – at the 
very least a formal and explicit statement of a set of competing propositions – and 2) that all probabilities are 
conditional must be explicit in any coherent formulation of scientific inference (Howson, 2000; p239). In other 
words, probability distributions are – fundamentally – expressions of the logical doxastic consequences of 
available information.  
It is also important to understand that although probability distributions are expressions of uncertainty, in that they 
describe relative doxastic states about the truth-values of various competing propositions, probability distributions 
cannot be related to actual uncertainty in any systematic way. This problem is well known (e.g., Knight, 1921, 
Taleb, 2010, Beven, 2016). The difference between having an expression of uncertainty and having an expression 
of uncertainty that can be related to real uncertainty is critical, and the remainder of Section 2 outlines why our 
inability to estimate uncertainty means that probability theory is insufficient to support a coherent account of 
science. Section 3 then describes how information theory fills the gap, and how this solves many of our day-to-
day practical problems related to testing models. 
2.2. Types of Uncertainty that Arise in Model/Hypothesis Testing 
																																																						
2What we call the propositional algebra is more often called a propositional calculus. It is, however, not a calculus since it does not contain any dynamic 
variable. It is actually an algebra, and we will refer to it as such so as to differentiate between this and a truly calculitic logic like probability theory. 
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To see why uncertainty is not a useful concept in science we must first understand what a model-based 
experiment looks like. An example of a common model-based experiment in the geosciences is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Here our model consists of various process representations denoted by 𝒽∗. These are Hempel & 
Oppenheim’s (1948) explanantia, and are statements that describe the dynamics of both the system under study 
and the measurement devices used to collect experimental data. The experiment also includes statements about 
various aspects of the system that are observable (at least in principle); these are denoted by random variables 
(e.g., 𝑢, 𝜃, 𝑦), which we refer to as phenomenological3. Finally, the experiment includes data that contain 
information about some of these phenomenological components.  
Note that data, represented here as 𝑧∗, are actually ontic in nature; for example, these are often the binary states of 
some computer memory. Data must be related to phenomenology via explanantia that represent a measurement 
processes, and it is important to remember that all measuring processes – probably including human perception 
and cognition (e.g,. Tononi, 2011) – are just dynamic physical systems. It is only after this model building process 
– i.e., after assigning one or more phenomenological variables and measurement models – that data facilitate 
statements about states of affairs. Such statements are artifacts of models, not of data themselves. To put this 
another way, recognizing a fundamental separation between phenomenological model building vs. hypothesis-
driven model building (e.g., Chalmers, 2013; chapter 1) seems to be an error. In other words, we take Quine’s 
(1951) all-inclusive epistemic fabric quite seriously, except – as pointed out above and by Quine (1986) – to note 
that we must have some system of logic to even formulate a question. 
 
Figure 1: A probabilistic science experiment involving a complex systems model. Process components (explanantia) 
are labeled 𝒽∗, phenomenological components – those that are observable – are labeled by random variables 𝑢, 𝜃, 𝑦, 
and experimental data are labeled 𝑧∗.  
The particular example of an experiment in Figure 1 recognizes three types of phenomenological components – 
model parameters 𝜃, boundary conditions 𝑢, and system responses 𝑦. More generally, any science experiment 
includes some experimental inputs (here 𝜃 and 𝑢) simply because by definition there are no accessible closed 
systems, and an experiment proceeds by developing and testing explanantia to predict responses of a perturbed 
system (perturbations may be natural or induced). We must keep track of the perturbations, in the form of 
information stored in data (here 𝑧! and 𝑧!), and this information can only be interpreted through some 
measurement model that relates data with various phenomenological components, and it is the act of interpreting 
data through a measurement model that admits something like observation error, which is actually a form of 
model error. Specifically, what we typically call measurement error is actually error in a measurement model. It 
is important that we aren’t tempted to reify the idea that data themselves contain error. Data are just physical 
																																																						
3The term phenomenological is used to refer to things that are, in principle, observable. Whether or not an entity is in principle observable is completely an 
aspect of the model itself. We make no a priori (model independent) claims about observability; the theory itself that is embedded in the model tells us 
whether a particular entity of a particular model is at least potentially observable, either directly or indirectly. 
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manifestations of portions of the universe, and the best the scientist can do is to accurately and precisely predict 
their interactions with experimental data using a descriptive (and predictive) model. 
An experiment contains two primary types of uncertainty: uncertainty related to data and uncertainty related to 
explanantia (various components of the model). Related to data, experimental perturbation data will generally not 
contain sufficient information to fully determine experimental response data. Variability in response data that 
cannot be explained by information (here variability) in perturbation data might come from real ontic (i.e., 
quantum4) randomness that manifests at relevant scales (Albrecht and Phillips, 2014), or simply from incomplete 
information about the actual perturbations to our system(s). Related to explanantia, uncertainty comes from the 
fact that we can never expect to perfectly characterize the dynamical processes in either the system under study, 
or our measurement devices. In context of any particular experiment, we might call the former type of uncertainty 
aleatory and the latter epistemic, where aleatory uncertainty refers to intrinsic randomness (here intrinsic relative 
to the experiment) and epistemic uncertainty is due to lack of perfect knowledge (here relative to the hypotheses, 
which are the explanatory objects) (Kiureghian and Ditlevsen, 2009).  
Note that the probability distributions around all of the process components (i.e., 𝒽∗) in Figure 1 represent 
epistemic uncertainty, and it is by marginalizing over these distributions that we are able to obtain probability 
distributions over phenomenological components, and finally over response data 𝑧! conditional on control data 𝑧! 
and 𝑧! as: ℳ 𝑧! 𝑧!, 𝑧! = 𝒽! 𝑧! 𝑦 𝒽! 𝑦 𝑢, 𝜃 𝒽! 𝑢 𝑧! 𝒽! 𝜃 𝑧! 𝑑𝒽!𝑑𝒽!𝑑𝒽!𝑑𝒽!𝜇!,!,! . [1] 
These predictions about actual data like 𝑝 𝑧! 𝑧! , 𝑧!  are the only things that a scientist can actually test. Further, 
aleatory uncertainty will manifest in 𝑝 𝑧! 𝑧! , 𝑧!  only if the various explanantia (i.e., the various 𝒽!, 𝒽!, 𝒽!, 
and 𝒽!) are themselves probabilistic, and this is fundamentally different from recognizing epistemic uncertainty 
in the choice of any specific set of explanantia since we may have a correct or incorrect probability distribution 
conditional on experimental perturbations.  
2.3. The Problem with Uncertainty 
There are apparently two ways to test models based on their predictions: either by inter-comparing several models 
or by treating each hypothetical model individually. In reality, these approaches are not different, because any 
family of models that we might want to compare is itself the model that we end up testing. However, to facilitate a 
discussion of the two main approaches to testing models that currently exist, the following subsections draw a 
distinction between Bayesian (e.g., Howson and Urbach, 1989) and falsificationist (e.g., Mayo, 1996) types of 
inference. This distinction is described by Gelman and Shalizi (2013), who recognize that the statistics 
community sometimes incorrectly refers to the former as inductive and the latter as hypothetico-deductive.  
The latter authors argue that there are certain inconsistencies between these two normative accounts vs. the way 
that they are actually applied in practice. Their poignant and illuminating treatment of this discrepancy between 
theory and practice nevertheless does not solve any underlying problem – instead of building a coherent 
normative theory of inference, they offer a largely ad hoc account of using two imperfect methods in tandem to 
help mitigate the deficiencies of each. Our argument in the following is that these differences between theory and 
practice betray deep underlying logical inconsistencies in both of the existing normative theories (Bayesian and 
falsificationism), and that such logical inconsistencies can be attacked directly by using a more complete system 
of logic. 
2.3.1. The Problem with Uncertainty for Bayesian Inference  
Bayesian inference compares some number of competing models by first assigning over this family a probability 
mass function or probability density function, and then conditioning that probability distribution on observation 
data. That is, it is suggested that we may recognize competing versions of things like 𝒽!, 𝒽!, 𝒽!, and 𝒽! as 
																																																						
4Quantum mechanics is the only known potential source of ontic randomness – all other randomness is epistemic (Jaynes, 2003; ch10). 
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somehow representative of epistemic uncertainty, and that by modifying our doxastic states distributed across 
these alternatives based on reconciliation with observation data will lead us to reliable inferences. 
The problem with this approach is that it is impossible to guarantee that any probabilistic inferences will be 
correct, or even consistent in any meaningful sense. Bayesian posteriors converge almost certainly to a true 
model, but this can only occur if a true model is assigned finite probability by the prior. This would require that 
the various epistemic distributions in Figure 1 over competing explanantia like 𝒽!, 𝒽!, 𝒽!, and 𝒽! be 
constructed such that they each place finite probability on at least one true process-representation. This alone is 
obviously unrealistic in all conceivable situations, however the problem is further complicated by the fact that any 
“true” explanantia must correctly represent aleatory uncertainty for each experiment that we put to it. So not only 
must we have a “true” process model, we also require a “true” statistical model of information missing from our 
experimental data for each and every set of experiments.  
When these conditions are not met, probabilistic inference over families of models is not guaranteed to converge 
(Berk, 1966), and if inference does converge, may not converge to models that give the best predictions (Oreskes 
and Belitz, 2001, Grünwald and Langford, 2007, Müller, 2013). Even if we ignore Hume’s (1748) problem and 
suppose that there does exist some space-time stationarity in the physics of the universe, so that that true models 
remain true, this does not mean that best approximations over past data will be best, or even reasonable, 
approximations over future data. For that, the error properties of our models would also have to be correctly 
characterized, which is indistinguishable from having a perfect model.  
This is exactly the problem of verisimilitude (Popper, 2014), which we will discuss further in Section 4. There is 
no sense in which any individual proposition may be said to be more or less “truthlike”, only that families of 
propositions (here models) contain as derivatives more or fewer true propositions. Popper proposed his theory of 
verisimilitude precisely to account for the difference between predictive adequacy and the “truthlikeness” of a 
model. The theory fails exactly because it only accounts for the nature of predictive statements that may be 
derived from a model.  
In simplest terms, the problem is that in a Bayesian framework we have no way to understand the relationship 
between our family of models and the true nature of either phenomenology or process in the system – we just 
search for the best among alternatives conditional on data. Gelman and Shalizi (2013) point out that the way 
scientists currently deal with this is by using a falsificationist type approach in conjunction with a Bayesian 
approach; to state it loosely, falsification is used for actual model testing and Bayesian methods are used for 
calibration. The falsificationist approach is discussed in the next subsection (Section 2.3.2). 
This issue causes real problems during inference. In a complex modeling chain, where epistemic uncertainty 
exists about a number of interacting model components, any misspecification of the distribution over one 
component will unavoidably bias probabilities placed on other components. An example of this was given by 
Beven (2008), and that example is expanded in Appendix A of this article. In these examples, errors in the 
specification of measurement models like 𝒽! and 𝒽! result in errors in the probabilities assigned to process 
descriptions 𝒽!.  
Because we cannot ever guarantee that any of our epistemic distributions meet criteria for reliable convergence to 
true models, we have at least the potential for inconsistency in any Bayesian inference problem. Given this, it is 
impossible to assign anything like reliable posterior probabilities over any particular family of hypothesis. The 
best that we can do is assign probabilities that are conditional on the other imperfect model components, which 
are themselves necessarily distributional and almost certainly misspecified. This is exactly the confirmation 
holism aspect of the Duhem-Quine thesis as it manifests in the context of Bayesian inference.  
To summarize the problem, it is that we are asking about truth-values of families of models that we know are all 
approximations. There is a fundamental logical contradiction inherent to the Bayesian philosophy itself. 
Remember that probabilities are doxastic measures associated with the truth-value of a given set of propositions, 
and so this logical error exists in any type of experiment where we attempt to assign probabilities to models. 
There is a contradiction between (i) the fact that we generally don’t have access to anything like a “true” model, 
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and (ii) the assignment of finite probabilities to models that we know with near certainty are incorrect. In fact, 
probabilistic inference methods assign doxastic states conditional on all information input to the problem, and 
given that any family of models is itself a model, there is no way to connect inferences over families of models 
with real epistemic uncertainty. 
To reiterate what we said in the introduction, we are not advocating a strict anti-realist perspective on models – 
models may be truth-apt (Cartwright, 1983) in a meaningful way – it’s just that since all models that we might 
actually construct are false (i.e., models invariably represent reality in some simplified or incomplete manner), it 
might be worthwhile to recognize this formally in our method of science.  
2.3.2. The Problem with Uncertainty for Statistical Hypothesis Testing   
Consider next the case where we treat each model individually. Popper’s (1959) motivation in developing a 
falsificationist perspective was the asymmetry between asserting truth vs. assessing falsehood. In particular, given 
Hume’s problem (i.e., that we can never guarantee that any generalization of data will apply outside of the domain 
of observation), all we can do under the classical logic described in Section 2.1 is to reject models that disagree 
with those data that we actually have in hand. The general strategy of naïve falsification might therefore be 
thought of as rejecting models that conflict with data, and while this would indeed solve both the practical and 
logical inconsistency problems discussed in Section 2.3.1 – since it doesn’t require that we express any degree of 
belief in the truth of any model – it does require that we have a logically consistent way to reject models. 
However, if we took this purely deductive approach and restricted ourselves to falsifying models directly via the 
modus tollens5, then essentially all models would be immediately falsified given only a small number of data. 
This is true even if we tested a perfect model, since the best a modeler can ever hope to do in the presence of 
aleatory uncertainty is to build a model that predicts with accuracy and precision warranted by the (partial) 
information content of the experimental perturbation data. Somewhat ironically, while confirmation holism tells 
us that no hypotheses can be rejected, it is also the case that all models will be rejected given any data. 
This following point is crucial: Bayesian methods cannot deal with epistemic uncertainty, in that they cannot tell 
us about anything about differences between model families and truth, and deductive methods cannot deal with 
aleatory uncertainty. This means (as Popper was well aware) that we must therefore apply some probabilistic or 
possibilistic version of falsification, and the result is that in general we are unable to strictly falsify any model. 
There is no longer any a priori criteria for rejecting models, and as Neyman (1957) put it, rejecting a model is an 
act of will rather than an act of rationality because the choice of rejection criteria is necessarily ad hoc. The 
problem is, however, worse than ad hoc rejection criteria – to have any criterion at all, ad hoc or otherwise, we 
must have some calculitic logic that allows us to develop some measure that may be associated with a given 
model and used as the quantitate basis for rejection. But now we are back where we started – we can't strictly 
falsify models, so instead we must associate with them some doxastic measure in the presence of incomplete 
experimental information.  
That being said, it is clear that some models are useful, and so one might suggest that it matters little if the pedant 
(us) calls them false. We propose, however, that the practice of assigning degrees of belief to the Boolean truth-
values associated with hypotheses or models that we know are incorrect is a primitive logical error that gives rise 
to essentially all of the practical problems we currently face related to evaluating the accuracy, precision, and 
reliability of complex systems models. Our point is that we should not use any method of inference that either 
implicitly or explicitly asks about the truth-value of any explanantia, and instead we wish to employ a quantitative 
method that recognize that treats this non-realism strictly. We should be measuring degrees of isomorphism, not 
degrees of belief.  
In other words, our objective is a method of science that a) does not require (but may allow for) comparing 
competing explanantia, and b) does not assign degrees of probability or confidence to models. Certainly, we want 
this method to be fully coherent with probability theory, given Cox’ theorem and that we will use the classical 
																																																						
5The modus tollens says if proposition 𝑃 implies proposition 𝑄 and 𝑄 is false, then 𝑃 is false: 𝑃 → 𝑄 ∧ ~𝑄 → ~𝑃. 
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logic: we do not necessarily wish to deny non-contradiction, although we certainly leave open that possibility 
(e.g., Kosko, 1990). 
3. The Solution: An Information-Based Science 
It is helpful to first notice is that there is a significant component of empirical logic that is missing from 
probability theory. Let’s see this by example. Suppose that we plan to conduct a series of experiments – to be 
concrete we will roll two dice. Before observing the outcome of the roll, our epistemic framework behaves 
multiplicatively: there 6×6 = 36 possible outcomes. After observing the outcome, our epistemic framework 
behaves additively: we now require 1 + 1 = 2 pieces of information (the actual outcomes of each experiment) to 
capture everything we now know about the state of the dice. In general, doxastic states – the measures of belief 
we place on all explicitly stated possibilities – behave according to a product rule before observing experimental 
outcomes and according to a sum rule afterwards. Knuth (2005) showed that this logarithmic collapse of doxastic 
states – from multiplicative to additive behavior over multiple experiments – is unique and general in the context 
of a distributive and unitary calculitic logic like probability theory. Given that this logarithmic change in behavior 
effected by observation is not actually a part of probability theory, it is difficult to see why probability theory 
should be a sufficient logic for conducting any type of empirical investigation.  
Notice that this argument for the incompleteness of probability theory is different than some others. For example, 
Pearl (2001) claimed that “the bulk of human knowledge is organized around causal, not probabilistic 
relationships” and that probability theory lacks causality. Pearl wishes to require that epistemic theory be 
designed to accommodate a particular a priori ontological view of the world (that physical laws are causal). Of 
course, we might counter-argue, as Hume did, that indeed all we may know are propensities. Whereas Pearl 
requires scientific epistemology to accommodate his a priori ontology, instead our argument is that no matter how 
we construct theories and models, probabilistic logic itself is incomplete because it doesn’t recognize a 
fundamental characteristic of belief itself – how the behavior of related belief states change during experiment. 
To state this symbolically, two experiments result in data 𝑧! and 𝑧! and our epistemic state changes due to 
observation as: 𝑝 𝑧!, 𝑧! = 𝑝 𝑧! 𝑧! 𝑝 𝑧! → ℎ 𝑧! 𝑧! + ℎ 𝑧! = ℎ 𝑧!, 𝑧! , [2] 
where ℎ .  is some measure of the information necessary to describe the outcome of our experiment. Given that 
this is a fundamental and necessary consequence of the epistemic environment described in Section 2.1, the 
question is how to account for it in practice. 
3.1. An Information-Based Scientific Method 
Let’s start by asking what is probably the most straightforward question a scientist can ask in the context of any 
particular experiment: Is there any information in my experimental data that could be used to improve my model? 
If the answer is yes then we reject the model in a strict sense because we know that this model has the potential to 
be improved given only currently available experimental data. If the answer is no then this means that we have 
not discovered any potential to mitigate deficiencies in the model. 
Figure 2 illustrates a scientific method structured around this question. Again we have some experimental 
perturbation data and some experimental response data, and again these are not immediately treated as 
representative of anything in particular (data are ontic states of affairs rather than propositions about states of 
affairs). The perturbation and response data are actually related according to the physics of whatever system we 
are trying to model, and thus variability in perturbation data at least partially informs variability in response data. 
Since the objective of science is apparently to understand process relationships (Davies, 1998), ideally we would 
measure the information about the relationship between experimental perturbations and responses that is actually 
contained in that data, and then compare this to the information about this same relationship as it is described by 
our model. We typically can’t do this directly, and so we do what is called science: we use tests of model 
predictions to reflect on the viability of model explanantia. We consider the act of using predictions to test 
hypotheses an essential component of any definition of science. 
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In this case, we want to compare information about process relationships contained in data vs. models, but will 
instead measure information about experimental response data that is available purely from relationships mined 
from data vs. information about experimental response data available from our hypothetical model that we want to 
test. Specifically, we will measure the information about experimental response data (𝑧!) contained in 
experimental perturbation data as some quantity 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧!  (for simplicity we will only notate 𝑧!, but this could 
include any experimental perturbation data, including 𝑧!), and the information about experimental response data 
contained in predictions made by model 𝓂: 𝑧! → 𝑧!, that maps 𝑧! onto a prediction 𝑧!, as some quantity 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! . If we use a self-equitable measure to quantify information (Kinney and Atwal, 2014) then information 
from the model is always bounded by the actual information content of the input data by the Data Processing 
Inequality (Gong et al., 2013): 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! ≥ 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! . [3] 
Supposing that we could estimate these two quantities: 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧!  and 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! , then the sign of their difference is 
sufficient to know whether information from the model is less than information from data. Again, a “yes” answer 
indicates potential to improve the model without collecting any new data.  
 
Figure 2: An information-based science experiment. Experimental perturbation data partially informs experimental 
response data according to the physics of the real system, including all measurement devices. The model attempts to 
emulate this relationship, and, by the data processing inequality, model outputs contain no more information about 
experimental response data than is contained in experimental perturbation data. If the model provides less information 
than we are able to extract empirically from experimental data perturbation/response pairs, then the model is 
improvable given only currently available data. 
The challenge is to measure the information content of experimental perturbation data: 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! , which requires 
that we know exactly the joint distribution between control/response data pairs. We obviously do not know this 
relationship exactly because if we did then we would not have need to test any further models. Instead we return 
to the actual desideratum, which is to test relationships rather than predictions, and ask simply whether the model 
provides as much information about the relationship between experimental perturbation and response data as we 
are actually able to extract by building a relationship purely from that data itself (Nearing and Gupta, 2015). The 
following explains. 
Although we can’t estimate 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧!  directly, we can bound it conservatively. For example, the current authors 
have approached this using nonparametric regression (e.g., Nearing et al., 2016a, Nearing and Gupta, 2015). 
Given an arbitrary empirically-derived mapping 𝓇: 𝑧! → 𝑧!, then by another application of the data processing 
inequality we have 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! ≥ 𝐼 𝑧!;𝓇 𝑧!  such that information missing from model 𝓂 is bounded: ℰ = 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! − 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! ; [4.1] ℰ = 𝐼 𝑧!;𝓇 𝑧! − 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! ; [4.2] 
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ℰ ≥ ℰ. [4.3] 
If 𝓇 has known convergence properties over large function classes (e.g., Hornik, 1991), then in principle and as 
long as metric 𝐼 itself admits a convergent estimator, we have a bounded and convergent estimate of the 
information content of experimental data. In practice, of course, we always must approximate by either 
optimizing or integrating over regression hyperparameters, and so our results are not actually convergent, but 
unlike purely probabilistic methods we have a logically consistent theory that we can at least approximate – and 
we are not in principle precluded from accomplishing our objectives as we were when conducting an experiment 
like in Figure 1. Not only that, this method is robust (i.e., bounded) to approximation in all cases except 
overfitting, which can be mitigated at least empirically by partitioning the experimental data into calibration and 
evaluation records when calculating 𝐼 𝑧!;𝓇 𝑧! . 
It’s worth pointing out that we really want to have a theoretical convergence proof for whatever strategy we use to 
estimate 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧!  from data. Ideally this would include theoretical convergence rates as well as an expression for 
the asymptotic distribution over the statistical estimator 𝐼 𝑧!;𝓇 𝑧!  in the limit of an increasing number of 
data, and perhaps even a series expansion that yields ordered bounds. However, such theoretical demonstration 
may or may not be possible for any particular estimator, and we will leave this as an open challenge. However, 
again, the point is that the basic theory is consistent and approximable even without a demonstration of 
asymptotic behavior. 
To summarize, a meaningful model evaluation experiment might seek to establish whether the model contains (at 
least) as much information about the relationship between experimental perturbation/response data as do the data 
themselves. Because we cannot directly measure information about relationships, we instead measure information 
about experimental response data that is contained in experimental perturbation data, and compare that with 
information contained in model predictions. Of course, we cannot measure information contained in experimental 
perturbation data without a model of the relationships underlying that data, and so our objective is to develop an 
empirical relationship between experimental perturbation data and experimental response data that is completely 
theory-free, or at least based solely on logical theory rather than ontological theory, and which seeks to extract all 
possible information about the perturbation/response relationship as possible from experimental data. We then 
measure the information about response data provided by whatever relationship we are able to extract purely from 
data vs. from our hypothetical model, and this conservatively bounds the information missing from the 
hypothetical model.  
3.2. Measures of Information for Hypothesis Testing 
In Section 3.1 we only required that information be quantified by a self-equitable metric so that we can employ 
the data processing inequality (Kinney and Atwal, 2014). This is, however, insufficient for logical consistency 
since we must account for Knuth’s (2005) description of the logarithmic relationship between information and 
probability (Equation [2]). This constraint is helpful because it reduces apparent freedom of choice about what 
information metric to use. 
Under probability theory, everything that we know about any potential data 𝑧! is described by some probability 
distribution 𝑝 𝑧!  – this distribution is an expression of available information before applying any explanatory or 
predictive hypotheses or conditioning on any exogenous data, like model inputs. Here we don't care about whether 
a true outcome is assigned finite probability, we only care that 𝑝 𝑧!  represents the distribution of our actual 
experimental response data 𝑧! in absence of any other data or any hypotheses – this is a frequency distribution. 
Next we obtain some data, say 𝑧!, and appropriately condition 𝑝 𝑧!  to obtain 𝑝 𝑧! 𝑧! . The resulting reduction 
in new information that we would need to identify any particular occurrence of 𝑧! is, by Equation [2], the 
difference ℎ 𝑧! − ℎ 𝑧! 𝑧! . We can compare this difference with the reduction in new information needed to 
fully determine 𝑧! if, instead of conditioning on 𝑧!, we were to condition on model predictions 𝑧!: ℎ 𝑧! −ℎ 𝑧! 𝑧! . The information that is available in model inputs that is missing from model predictions is ℎ 𝑧! 𝑧! −
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ℎ 𝑧! 𝑧!  and, according to the data processing inequality, this quantity is always non-negative as long as the 
conditional and shared information measures behave additively as: 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! = ℎ 𝑧! − ℎ 𝑧! 𝑧! . This is 
precisely the relationship that is satisfied by the standard Shannon-type entropy and mutual information metrics 
(Cover and Thomas, 1991). 
It is useful to develop an epistemological perspective on the uniqueness of Shannon’s entropy and mutual 
information measures, but first let’s define them. Entropy is the expected amount of information about a random 
variable that can be gained by observing that variable, and is defined as: ℎ 𝑧! = 𝑝 𝑧! = 𝜁 ln 𝑝 𝑧! = 𝜁 !! 𝑑𝜁, [5.1] 
So, entropy is (in some sense) a measure of the variability in a probability distribution over a random variable6. 
Following from this, mutual information is the expected reduction in entropy of one random variable that is 
caused by conditioning on a correlated variable; e.g.: 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! = ℎ 𝑧! − ℎ 𝑧! 𝑧! , [5.2] 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! = 𝑝 𝑧! = 𝜁, 𝑧! = 𝜈 ln 𝑝 𝑧! = 𝜁 𝑧! = 𝜈𝑝 𝑧! = 𝜁 𝑑𝜁𝑑𝜈. [5.3] 
So, mutual information is the expected amount of information about one variable that is contained in a realization 
of a correlated variable, and so 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧!  specifically measures the expected reduction in the amount of entropy 
that would be achieved by directly observing 𝑧! depending on whether we had first conditioned on 𝑧!. The 
quantity 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧!  is similar, except here we are concerned with model predictions such that the model predictions 
are independent of experimental response data conditional on experimental perturbation data.  
Notice that 𝐼 .  is a special case of integration over a transformed ratio of a conditional distribution to its 
marginal: 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! = 𝐸 𝑓 𝑝 𝑧! 𝑧!𝑝 𝑧! . [6] 
There are three important component attributes of this statistic. The first is the probability ratio itself, which is 
simply the expression of the relationship between marginal and conditional knowledge about 𝑧! given 𝑧!. The 
second important aspect is the integration itself. In general the probability ratio is high dimensional (infinite-
dimensional in the case of continuous random variables), and the integration collapses such distributions to a 
metric. The integration is purely for tractability, and thus we may want to integrate several different statistics to 
understand different aspects of the probability ratio. The third important aspect of this statistic is the log-
transform. While the conversion from a distribution to a metric is general as long as we allow for any transform of 
the probability ratio inside of our integration, we will specifically obtain a self-equitable metric as long as our 
transform is convex (Csiszár, 1972). Here, however, we must use Shannon’s logarithm, 𝑓 𝑢 = −𝑢ln 𝑢 , to be 
consistent with Equation [2]. 
Further, it is important to stress that the above information metrics are not bridge principles. Bridge principles are 
tools used to join together different bodies of theory (Carnielli and Coniglio, 2007), and typically, model 
evaluation metrics are treated as epistemic bridges that relate the model’s ontological predictions with appropriate 
epistemic consequences (i.e., probability distributions). In contrast, the above information metrics derive uniquely 
from the same system of logic that supports probability theory in the first place. That is, if our epistemic theory 
admits probabilities, then we do not need any bridge principles to quantify model performance, we are forced to 
																																																						
6We won’t pretend that statistical entropy is in any way related to uncertainty, even though we have used that language in previous publications. The reason 
that this is incorrect is again that the distributions like 𝑝(𝑧∗) that are integrated to get quantities like ℎ .  suffer from the usual degeneracies, and therefore 
have no systematic relationship with uncertainty. We simply drop the concept of uncertainty altogether – it is not useful. 
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use information theory. Moreover, by using this theory, we get the scientific method outlined in Figure 2, which 
avoids essentially all of the pitfalls discussed in Section 2.  
It is interesting to notice that linearized epistemic bridges are very common (e.g., Tian et al., 2016, Taylor, 2001, 
Gupta et al., 2009), and these are chosen apparently for mathematical convenience. What we have argued above is 
that there is a real (not arbitrary) linearity in our epistemological theory that is exploited to result in additive 
measures of model performance. This linearity does not result from convenience, but rather results necessarily as 
a fundamental property of distributive logic. While Nearing & Gupta (2015) showed that the standard linearized 
evaluation metrics (mean-squared error, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, additive mean bias) are 
special cases of the integration in Equation [6] that come from assigning specific integrating functions 𝑓 .  and 
specific parametric forms of the conditional and marginal probabilities, the only integrating function that makes 
Equation [6] coherent with Equation [2] is Shannon’s: 𝑓 𝑢 = −𝑢ln (𝑢).  
In particular, the metrics in Equation [5] are apparently unique under the following choices: 
• First, the choice to use a two-valued logic that includes non-contradiction, so that propositions are either true 
or false but not both. An example of an alternative to this is Fuzzy Logic (Kosko, 1990). 
• Second, the choice to represent our dynamic beliefs about various propositions using a scalar belief metric 
(Van Horn, 2003). Then by Cox’ theorem we have probability theory, and by Knuth’s theorem probabilities 
collapse logarithmically over repeated experiments. 
• Third, the choice to work with metrics rather than distributions. The integrations that turn distributions into 
statistics results in Shannon’s information theory.  
This does not, however, mean that there are no choices left to make. The fact that we are quantifying information 
by taking an expected value (i.e., an integration over the distributions) is important. Any statistical procedure 
requires some representative sample, and so we must integrate our statistics over some finite number of 
experimental trials – and the choice of integration domain matters. That is, our results will depend on which 
experimental data we consider. Ideally we would consider all existing experimental data that is in any way 
relevant to our hypotheses, but in practice this is obviously impossible. Again, however, the point is that we can 
make reliable (bounded) hypothetico-deductive inferences in the context of whatever experimental data we do 
decide to use. Moreover, we can actually use differences between integration domains to quantify process 
stationarity (e.g., Nearing et al., in prep).  
Another important choice is about which aspect(s) of our experimental data we want to investigate. There is 
apparently nothing that prevents us from manipulating data before calculating information statistics. For example, 
we may be concerned only with extreme events, and we may therefore assign phenomenological variable 𝑦 to 
represent some aspect of our definition of “extreme”. Or we may care about time-series matching, in which case 𝑦 
might represent some aspect(s) of a power spectrum. In all cases, our model will predict the particular aspect of 
the experimental data that we want to test, and we may also actually manipulate the actual experimental data (e.g., 
calculate its power spectrum). Notice that manipulating experimental results does not actually constitute applying 
a data model or measurement model – it is simply physical manipulation of data via some information-processing 
device like a computer, and we will simply test the extent to which our holistic model accounts for whatever 
eventual data we put it up against. 
The result of this is apparently a theory of hypothesis testing that solves two basic problems: 1) we can test 
models that do not inherently admit probabilistic predictions (thereby avoiding the degeneracy problem related to 
separating aleatory uncertainty), and 2) we do not require any ad hoc epistemic bridges or ad hoc falsification 
criteria. Our falsification criteria here are never perfect (obtained through high-dimensional nonparametric 
regression) but if calculated reliably, they always provide a lower bound on the available information, and 
therefore, at least in theory, we can test models without any chance of Type I error. A toy application of this 
theory is given in Appendix B. Note that this example extends the inconsistency example in Appendix A.  
4. Right Answers for the Right Reasons 
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In Section 3.1, we made a distinction between testing models based on their ability to inform process 
relationships vs. their ability to make informative predictions. The risk in doing the latter is that we may build 
models that are informative over particular data sets for wrong reasons – either by chance or by kludging. 
Kludging happens when informative predictions are derived from model behavior that is not isomorphic with real 
system dynamics (Clark, 1987). 
Of course, potential for kludging is not unique to the theory we’ve proposed. For example, Popper (2014) dealt 
with the fact that our best scientific theories and models are often strictly false by defining a concept of 
verisimilitude, or approximation of truth. According to Popper, one theory is a better approximation of truth than 
another if it entails more true (presumably phenomenological) statements. This fails to solve the problem, 
however, because testing the truth of entailed propositions is exactly the definition of testing a model’s ability to 
make true predictions.  
As far as we can tell, the problem of assessing truthlikeness or verisimilitude is intractable. Instead, we might 
approach the problem from a reductionist perspective. Under the assumption that there does exist regularity in the 
universe, and that it is the objective of a scientist to discover this regularity, then we not only want informative 
models, we want models that are reliably informative because they generate predictions using processes that are 
isomorphic with whatever dynamic aspects of the system are actually process-stationary. This is what the 
reductionist means when we say that we want right answers for the right reasons, and is the only feasible concept 
of reliability that the current authors can imagine.  
So can we at least measure process isomorphism in physical systems? Again, we can't measure information about 
individual process relationships embedded in a model, but we can measure information transferred through 
individual process relationships. This is not unlike measuring information provided by model predictions except 
that here we don’t have anything like experimental perturbation data, since in any complex model with many 
interacting process relationships the inputs to each process component are themselves modeled variables. We 
cannot simply dissect a complex systems model and run each component separately, because the model must 
include interactions between all of the various hypothetical process relationships. Although environmental models 
often do not contain explicit field equations, the governing conservation equations will generally include many 
directly or indirectly interacting effects.  
So we will not ask whether particular process relationships embedded in a model individually produce 
informative predictions; instead we will treat models as networks of interacting processes. Perhaps those inclined 
to Pearl’s perspective on causality might call these causal networks, and recognize that they cannot be evaluated 
in the same way as holistic models because of the lack of experimental perturbation data on the model side.  
 
Figure 3: A process network representing a typical ecohydrology model. Nodes represent phenomenological variables 
and edges represent components of explanantia.  
More generally, because we are using probability theory we will treat process networks as so-called Bayesian 
networks. An example of a Bayesian network of a typical ecohydrology model is given in Figure 3. Each node in 
this network represents a phenomenological variable with some spatiotemporal extent, and we represent 
variability (not uncertainty) in each node using probability distributions that are conditional on all variables 
upstream in the network. The edges in the network represent explanantia that manifest as probabilistic 
conditioning relationships. Again, these probabilities do not represent uncertainty but rather partial 
P  = precipitation 
Rn  = net radiation 
SM  = soil moisture 
An  = carbon assimilation 
LAI  = leaf area index 
gs          = stomatal resistance 
NEE  = net ecosystem exchange 
Qh  = sensible heat flux 
Qe  = latent heat flux  
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informativeness – the conditioning variable informs observed or modeled variability in the conditioned variable. 
Even if all equations in the model are deterministic each variable is still probabilistic conditional on only a subset 
of whatever other variables determine its value at any point during the simulation. Our objective is to quantify the 
influence that each variable has on all others in the real world, and then to see whether the model reliably 
simulates these partially informative relationships.  
To quantify the influence that one variable, say 𝑦!, has on another variable, say 𝑦!, in a dynamic (time-evolving) 
Markovian (i.e., local or causal) system, we would measure the expected effect of conditioning 𝑦! at time 𝑡 + 𝑠 
on the value of 𝑦! at time 𝑡 given that all of the variables in the model other than 𝑦! (notate these as 𝑦~!) also had 
particular values at time 𝑡. We therefore measure the influence of 𝑦! on 𝑦! in a Markov system over some time 
lag 𝑠 as: 𝐼 𝑦!!!!; 𝑦!!|𝑦~!! = 𝑝 𝑦~!! 𝑝 𝑦!!!!, 𝑦!! 𝑦~!! ln 𝑝 𝑦!!!! 𝑦!! , 𝑦~!!𝑝 𝑦!!!! 𝑦~!! 𝑑𝑦!!!! 𝑑𝑦!! 𝑑 𝑦~!! . [7.1] 
This metric typically has to be approximated due to a problem of dimensionality (𝑦~! is high-dimensional), and 
the most common approximation is called transfer entropy (Schreiber, 2000): 𝐼 𝑦!!!!; 𝑦!!|𝑦!! = 𝑝 𝑦!! 𝑝 𝑦!!!!, 𝑦!! 𝑦!! ln 𝑝 𝑦!!!! 𝑦!! , 𝑦!!𝑝 𝑦!!!! 𝑦!! 𝑑𝑦!!!! 𝑑𝑦!! 𝑑 𝑦!! . [7.2] 
Transfer entropy relies on a strong Markovian approximation whereby the time history of the whole model, 𝑦~!!  is 
substituted by the time history of the target variable, 𝑦!!. The result is that this metric only ever requires 
integration over a 3-dimensional probability distribution, and is therefore generally feasible to estimate given a 
realistic number of data. 
Equations [7] calculate the strength of directed interactions between each pair of phenomenological variables in 
our model at any spatiotemporal scale (if desired we can substitute the time indexes for spatial indexes). If we had 
complete observations of all phenomenological variables we could construct similar process networks from data 
and compare the strengths of interactions derived from data with the hypothetical strength of interactions from our 
model. The model may either over-estimate or under-estimate the informativeness of any one variable about any 
other, and both over-estimation and under-estimation in this case is undesirable.  
Of course, we must deal with the very real problem that we will never be able to directly observe every 
phenomenological component of our modeled system, and therefore cannot expect to actually construct Bayesian 
networks or calculate all necessary transfer entropy metrics directly from observations. However, we can do this 
with whatever (partial) observations we do actually have available, and again the point is that we have a coherent 
and general theory that we can approximate in practice. Further, we propose that we can even take advantage of 
partial observations by using data assimilation-based system identification, which is the application of Bayes’ 
theorem to condition the internal states of a model on information in whatever observations we do actually have 
available (e.g., Bulygina and Gupta, 2011, Wilkinson et al., 2011). The idea being to measure how conditioning 
model phase-space trajectories change (Wikle and Berliner, 2007) conditional on information in observation data, 
and how this implies changes to process-level information transfers within the model. 
A simple example of this theory is given in Appendix C, while Drewery et al. (in prep) give several more 
sophisticated examples. We will not go into further detail here except to say that this type of Bayesian system 
identification does not suffer from the problem of inconsistency under degeneracy, because we are simply asking 
how observations project onto the phase trajectories of whatever model we have proposed. We are not using data 
assimilation to search for a “true” phase trajectory or “true” Bayesian information transfer network, we are using 
data assimilation to ask how much our observations can inform changes to modeled phase trajectories and 
modeled process-level information transfer.  
It’s worth pointing out that this diagnostic approach (with or without data assimilation) does not tell us whether 
we are missing any important processes in the model. However, it does help us understand whether whatever 
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processes we have hypothesized and modeled interact in ways that are apparently isomorphic with observed 
interactions. This is not a formal approach to gaining knowledge, only an approach to gaining diagnostic insight 
into the structure and functioning of complex models.  
5. Discussion: Science Arbitration and Predicting with Limited Information  
In the preceding sections we argued for a particular perspective on evaluating models for the purpose of scientific 
learning. However, another purpose of building science-informed models is to make predictions that contribute to 
societal management and decision strategies. This is called science arbitration (Pielke, 2007), and it might seem 
inevitable that successful and comprehensive model-based arbitration requires communicating predictive 
uncertainty to decision makers. We argue that this is a somewhat misleading prescription. Instead, what the 
scientist actually wants to do is to communicate to decision-makers predictions that represent the scientist’s best 
available information. Such predictions will necessarily be distributional, but will not be representative of 
uncertainty in any meaningful sense. The scientist should also communicate all choices that were made during 
model development and evaluation – for example by using formal decision trees (Beven, 2016). 
So how do we predict with our best available information? The first thing that we must do is to ensure that we do 
not pretend to have more information than we actually have. We should not over-constrain our models. The 
practice of producing deterministic predictions and then appending to these “uncertainty distributions” or “error 
distributions” is very strange indeed. This practice essentially boils down to over-estimating our available 
information in the first place and then adding more information about that overestimation. Instead, a better 
organizing question seems to be about how we might construct models that do not require that we pretend to have 
more information than we actually have from theories, hypotheses, and data. 
Methodologically this perspective implies a very different approach to model development. In particular, we 
suspect that this perspective will lead to a strategy for constructing models of complex systems that does not use 
differential equations to represent conservation laws. Instead we expect that in the not-too-distant future the 
general approach to constructing models of conservative macro-scale dynamical systems will involve imposing 
conservation laws expressed as symmetry constraints, via Noether’s theorem, on maximum entropy distributions. 
The motivation for using maximum entropy distributions is that the basic project when developing a model under 
a calculitic epistemic theory is to construct a joint distribution between all modeled variables over the entire 
(perhaps spatiotemporal) domain of the simulation. In the case where we know absolutely nothing about the 
system, this distribution will be non-informative. Any theory, hypothesis, or data that we have or want to test will 
provide information about the behavior of the system, and should be used to constrain this joint distribution. In a 
discrete model (e.g., like what a finite element or finite difference approach produces), this joint distribution 
would be a directed Bayesian network. The structure of the creative project in science is now to develop 
hypotheses about dynamic systems that act directly as epistemic constraints on Bayesian networks, instead of as 
flux or source/sink terms in governing or field equations. 
6. Conclusion 
To reduce the situation to a vague analogy, quantifying uncertainty is very much like trying to measure cold or 
dark – uncertainty is the absence of knowledge, and it seems natural that we might instead develop theories 
around the thing that we actually have access to: heat, light, or information. The constructive question – which we 
have started to answer here – is about how we accomplish our scientific inference and arbitration objectives in 
this context. After writing this paper, we struggle somewhat to understand why uncertainty quantification has 
enjoyed such a central place in both the philosophy and practice of science. The idea of assigning truth-values to 
hypotheses or models, and trying to assess our limited ability to do so seems to be a somewhat contrived or 
fantastical objective. It seems much more natural to try to understand and quantify what information we have 
available from data about our models. In general, information-based approaches to inference, arbitration, and 
communication seem much more coherent, straightforward, and intuitive than uncertainty-based approaches.  
The proposal is to avoid associating doxastic states directly with things that we have any fundamental uncertainty 
about – like hypotheses, models, or future data. Instead, we recognize that probabilities are expressions of partial 
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information rather than expression of partial uncertainty, and we use probabilities simply to quantify partially 
informative relationships between ontic states (i.e., actually-existing hypothetical and experimental data).  
It is essentially indisputable in the modern era that probability theory is a system of logic, and the theory we 
propose is absolutely built around this fact. However, our theory only ever applies probabilities to represent 
counting distributions. The reason for this is that under empiricism, we gain information by actual experience, and 
so when we account for the doxastic effects of experiment we are fundamentally counting. More specifically, we 
do assign doxastic measures, but only to phenomenological entities and not to theoretical entities, and then only 
based on empirically available information. By refusing to explicitly treat explanantia as truth-apt (although 
leaving open the possibility for any type of realism the scientist might prefer), we are taking an approach that is 
quite similar to the old frequentist interpretation of probability theory. This is perhaps not surprising since 
frequentism is a special case of the Cox-Jaynes interpretation of probabilities as expressions of rational doxastic 
consequences of partial information (Terenin and Draper, 2015).  
Although Howson (2000) did not call on Cox or Jaynes directly, that same mature theory of probability theory as 
epistemic logic is what he was referring to when he said “The 300-year-old programme for an inductive logic 
based on formal probability has arrived finally at maturity … now, for the first time in its long history, it can 
display its own explanatory credentials as an authentic species of logic, kindred to deductive logic.” The 
development of this theory is almost certainly one of humanity’s greatest achievements, however it is not a 
complete description of empirical inquiry without Knuth’s (2005) demonstration of the relationship between the 
logic of questions (probability theory) and the logic of answers (information theory). Only now, in the beginning 
of the 21st century, are we entering an era where we have access to what seems to be a complete logic of inquiry, 
and although the problem of deriving non-ad hoc hypothesis tests is quite old, it does seem that the time is ripe for 
progress. 
To restate our central claim, the only question that a scientist can coherently ask and reliably answer is: “Does my 
model capture all of the information that is present in my experimental data?” 
Appendix A: An Example of Bayesian Inconsistency 
The purpose of this toy example is to show that probabilistic inference is inconsistent under degeneracy. In 
particular, incorrect phenomenological distributions result in not only incorrect, but actually contradictory (under 
different assumptions), inferences over ensembles. We draw inspiration for this example from Beven et al. (2008), 
who showed that incorrect likelihood functions result in incorrect parameter estimates; their likelihood function is 
effectively an approximation of the result of integrating Equation [1], and if we get this approximation wrong (in 
their example by using an incorrect phenomenological distribution over 𝑦 appended to each parameterized 
model), then we cannot expect to obtain either correct or consistent parameter inferences. This is exactly an 
example of the Bayesian reliability problem that we are discussing here, and we demonstrate this same effect on 
assigning probabilities to competing models after marginalizing over parameters. 
Later, in Appendix B, we extrapolate this example to demonstrate that information theory allows us to obtain 
reliable measures of information missing from experimental data and from model predictions, and to do this we 
use a synthetic experiment where the correct answer is known exactly. The synthetic inference problem was 
constructed using daily precipitation (in [mm]) and daily potential evaporation (in [mm]) data from the Leaf River 
catchment in Mississippi, USA to simulate a 1000-day streamflow record (also in mm) with the HyMod (Boyle, 
2000) model that included three slow-flow tanks. The output time series from this simulation was taken as 
synthetic ‘truth’ data, and the record was split into a 500-day warm-up period and a 500-day observation period. 
The model outflow fraction parameters and were sampled uniformly over [0,1]; the soil moisture storage 
parameter was sampled uniformly over [0-1000] mm, and the infiltration exponent uniformly over [0,10].  
The ensemble ℳ consisted of two competing model structures: a three-bucket Nash cascade and the abc-
hydrology model, both run at a daily timestep. In both models, the parameters are outflow ratios sampled 
uniformly over [0,1]; 500 parameter sets were sampled for each model. Additionally 500 different time series of 
daily precipitation were sampled from each of three different measurement distributions – all stationary iid 
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Gaussian with standard deviations of 𝜎! = 0.01,𝜎! = 0.1, and 𝜎! = 0.5. We then calculated probabilities for 
each of the 500×500 = 250,000 model simulations from each of three input distributions using each of three 
different measurement distributions over streamflow with the same standard deviations as before: 𝜎! =0.01,𝜎! = 0.1, and 𝜎! = 0.5. In total there were nine experiments each consisting of 250,000 runs of each of two 
models.  
 
Figure A.1: Inconsistent results in a synthetic multi-model inverse problem. Model probabilities depend on the choice 
of phenomenological distributions over precipitation and streamflow. Error bars represent one standard deviation over 
bootstrapped samples of the observations. 
Probabilities associated with each of the two competing models were calculated by bootstrapping daily 
observations from the observation period and then marginalizing over all 250,000 models parameter/boundary 
condition combinations in each of the nine experiments. The relative probabilities placed over the two-model 
ensemble are presented in Figure A.1. Ten bootstrapped observation samples were used to calculate the means 
and standard deviations that are plotted – bootstrapping was done to avoid undue influence of any individual 
observation, since probabilities are multiplicative over observations and we necessarily used a finite data record.  
The take-away from Figure A.1 is that we get completely different results in even the relative rankings of the two 
models depending on the choice of measurement distributions. In some cases the ABC model is assigned greater 
than 50% probability on average (across bootstrap samples) and in others the Nash cascade is assigned greater 
than 50% probability. There is no consistency. More generally, we will never in practice find ourselves in a 
situation where our models only have a single uncertain component, and for any situation where our modeling 
chain has interacting degeneracies in uncertainty distributions, inference results will always at least have the 
potential to be inconsistent. 
Appendix B: Consistency of Inferences under Information Theory 
Here we re-examine the synthetic example given in Appendix A from the information-based perspective outlined 
in Section 3. This is an example of what the information-based method looks like as it approximates correct 
answers to the inference problem under uncertainty.  
As in Appendix A, daily precipitation [mm] and potential evaporation [mm] were used to create synthetic ‘true’ 
streamflow data using HyMod (𝑧!), and synthetic precipitation forcings were then generated by sampling 
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perturbations from iid Gaussian distributions to generate several different forcing data sets (𝑧!). This time instead 
of sampling from three forcing distributions, we sampled from several with increasing standard deviations, in 
order to provide more resolution in the effect of limited information content of forcing data. Just as in Appendix 
A, several 3-bucket Nash cascades and abc-hydrology models were used to simulate daily streamflow over a 
10,000-day period using these perturbed forcings 
True measures of information missing from each set of synthetic precipitation data was measured by running the 
perturbed forcings through the real system (HyMod) and calculating the entropy of the synthetic observations 
conditional on each of the resulting streamflow series. These quantities are notated as 𝐻 𝑧! 𝑧! . True measures of 
the information missing from each model were calculated by running each synthetic precipitation data series 
through one of our competing models – either a three-bucket Nash cascades or an abc-hydrology model, each 
with different parameters – to generate model predictions 𝑧!.  Parameter samples were the same as those used in 
Appendix A. The difference 𝐻 𝑧! 𝑧!  and the resulting model-conditional entropies 𝐻 𝑧! 𝑧!  quantify the 
entropy due to model error according to Equation [4.2]. As in Appendix A, there were two model structures and 
500 parameter samples.  
 
Figure B.1: Convergence of mutual information statistics during calibration and testing data records after training 
neural networks to estimate 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑓 𝑧! . 
Again, the objective of this example is to demonstrate that we can accurately estimate information missing from 
the model using Equation [4.1]. The quantities 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑓 𝑧!  were calculated using single-layer feed-forward 
neural networks to regress each set of (lagged) precipitation data onto streamflow observation data. We used a 
ninety-day lag period, so that there were ninety precipitation inputs used to predict each streamflow output. It is 
important that our regression models are not overfit when used to bound 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! ≥  𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑓 𝑧! . To assess 
this, neural networks were trained on an increasing fraction of the total data record and the trained networks were 
used to predict both in-sample and out-of-sample data points. The objective is for the in-sample and out-of-sample 
information statistics to converge, which is what we see in Figure B.1. In particular, the in-sample and out-of-
sample statistics converged to within 5% of each other with about 5000 training data. 
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Figure B.2: Real vs. estimated information missing from (i) experimental perturbation data and (ii) model predictions. 
Next, the out-of-sample predictions made by these trained networks were used to calculate 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑓 𝑧!  statistics, 
which bound the 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧!  statistics that we really want. The mutual information between Nash cascade 
predictions and each different input data set, 𝐼 𝑧!; 𝑧! , were then used in Equation [4.1] to bound information 
missing from the model according to ℰ ≤ ℰ. Figure B.2 compares ‘real’ vs. estimated missing information (from 
experimental data and model predictions) as a function of the standard deviation of forcing perturbations. Error 
bars represent one standard deviation over 30 repeated experiments using different Nash cascade 
parameterizations (again parameters were sampled uniformly over [0,1]). Unlike in Appendix A, we treat each 
model individually and there is no need to marginalize over parameters (although this could de done if we wanted 
to test a model that included a parameter distribution). Information missing from the model predictions is always 
underestimated, as expected, but in this case the under-estimation is generally less than 5% relative error.  
Appendix C: An Example of Process-Level Diagnostics 
This appendix includes a demonstration of the verisimilitude theory outlined in Section 4 applied to a simple 
rainfall-runoff model like what were used in the previous two appendices. In this case we used the HyMod model 
with real-world precipitation and streamflow data from the same Leaf River catchment. Since we are interested to 
understand somehow the realism of internal mechanics of this model, we need to have some understanding of the 
model itself. A conceptual illustration of the HyMod rainfall-runoff simulator is in Figure C.1 - in this model a 
watershed is conceptualized as a set of water mass stores with linear outflow rates. 
 
Figure C.1: A conceptual diagram of the HyMod rainfall-runoff simulator. Markov state variables are labeled 𝑥∗, the 
precipitation boundary condition is 𝑢!, the potential evaporation boundary condition is 𝑢!, and simulated streamflow 
is 𝑦!. Model parameters (not notated) control the height of a nonlinear soil moisture storage tank, the outflow ratios 
from each storage bucket, and the fractional partitioning of soil moisture into surface runoff (𝑥!) and subsurface 
runoff (𝑥!). 
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Figure C.2 shows what this same model looks like when conceptualized as a Bayesian network. The same 
phenomenological variables are labeled, and the network connections illustrate the paths of information flow 
during one timestep of numerical integration. The only observed variable is streamflow, and this is observed at the 
integration timestep (daily). Our objective is to use information from that single observed time series to learn 
about overall process-level deficiencies in the model. 
 
Figure C.2: A Bayesian network illustration of the same model as in Figure C.1. 
Predictive accuracy (as quantified using a mean-squared error) of all of these procedures (calibration, data 
assimilation, and system identification) are illustrated in Figure C.3. It is, of course, entirely inappropriate to use 
a squared error metric in any way during the process of conducting science (see Section 3.2) but for illustrative 
purposes this is sufficient and sufficiently simple to make the point. The point is that calibration helps improve 
model performance both during calibration and evaluation (forecasting) periods. Data assimilation, which only 
updates initial states for prediction, only improved model accuracy during the calibration period where we had 
observations available to assimilate. System identification, on the other hand assimilated observations in the same 
way as data assimilation, however it encoded the information from those observations into the structure of the 
Bayesian network, which facilitated better predictions not only during the calibration period, but also during the 
evaluation period. 
More to the point of what we want to do here, we can measure the process-level information flows within the 
model before vs. after system identification to understand what assimilated information from our observation data 
has to tell us about deficiencies in the model structure. We apply Equation [7.2] to calculate information flows 
along each edge of the Bayesian network illustrated in Figure C.2 both before and after system identification. The 
differences between the values of the prior and posterior transfer metrics are illustrated in Figure C.4. This figure 
shows differences in information transfers between pairs of modeled variables that were effected by assimilating 
streamflow observations. 
 
Figure C.3: Squared error metrics from calibration and evaluation periods. Results show how system identification 
stores information from data assimilation into a predictive model by turning that model into a Bayesian network (like 
in Figure C.2) and then updating the network itself. 
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The purpose of making these plots is first to locate (and compare the relative magnitudes of) individual 
deficiencies in the model. The story in this example is that the model is strongly underestimating the role of 
precipitation on the soil moisture storage variable, which suggests that the biggest weakness in this model is the 
infiltration function. Additionally we see model underestimations of influence between the soil moisture state and 
the surface and subsurface storage states, implying that soil moisture should play a larger role in mediating 
surface runoff and subsurface flow. 
 
Figure C.4: Absolute differences between pairwise directed information transfers in HyMod before vs. after 
assimilating daily streamflow observations over a period of three years. The degree of red shading reflects larger 
differences in process-level relationships indicated by observations. 
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